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Firms have multiple options at the time of adjusting 
their wage bills. However, previous literature has mainly 
focused on base wages. This paper broadens the analysis 
beyond downward rigidity in base wages by investigating 
the use of other margins of labor cost adjustment at the 
firm level. Using data from a unique survey, the authors 
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find that firms make frequent use of other, more flexible, 
components of compensation to adjust the cost of labor. 
Changes in bonuses and non-pay benefits are some of the 
potential margins firms use to reduce costs. The paper 
also shows how the margins of adjustment chosen are 
affected by firm and worker characteristics.The Margins of Labour Cost Adjustment:       
Survey Evidence from European Firms 
 
 























Keywords: labour costs, wage rigidity, firm survey, European Union 
JEL codes: J30, C81, P5 
                                                 
* Author affiliations: Jan Babecký (Czech National Bank,  jan.babecky@cnb.cz), Philip Du Caju 
(National Bank of Belgium, philip.ducaju@nbb.be), Theodora Kosma (Bank of Greece, 
tkosma@bankofgreece.gr), Martina Lawless (Central Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland, 
martina.lawless@centralbank.ie), Julian Messina (World Bank,  jmessina@worldbank.org) and Tairi 
Rõõm (Bank of Estonia, tairi.room@epbe.ee).  
The work was conducted within the framework of the Wage Dynamics Network coordinated by the 
European Central Bank. We thank for helpful comments Giuseppe Bertola, Aleš Bulíř, Gabriel Fagan,  
Jaromír Gottwald, Jan Hošek, Juan Jimeno, Ana Lamo, Frank Smets, Silvia Fabiani, Juan Jimeno, an 
anonymous referee of the ECB WP series and all the participants of the WDN meetings, seminars at the 
Bank of Estonia and the Czech National Bank. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of 




Apart from a decrease in base wages, firms could use other ways of reducing labour costs 
when faced by negative external shocks, for example by cutting bonuses and benefits, 
encouraging earlier retirement and hiring workers at lower wages than those who have 
recently quit. The adjustment of non-wage labour costs has gained attention in the policy 
debate due to two main reasons. First, non-wage labour costs represent a substantial part of 
total compensation. Since firms are primarily concerned with total compensation per 
employee, an assessment of the flexibility of non-wage labour costs is as important as 
evaluation of the degree of wage flexibility. Second, in an environment of sticky prices and 
nominal wages, non-wage labour costs become an important adjustment tool to external 
shocks, allowing dampening of the effects of negative demand shocks on the firm’s 
employment.  
 
Using a unique survey of firms from 12 countries of the European Union conducted between 
the second half of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 within the framework of the Wage 
Dynamics Network coordinated by the European Central Bank, we examine the importance 
and determinants of alternative strategies firms might use to adjust their labour costs. In our 
survey, we asked firms’ managers directly about their use of these policies in the recent past. 
In this paper we analyse factual responses about the types of margins firms have used in the 
last five years preceding the survey. Specifically, we are able to identify the incidence of the 
following six labour-cost saving strategies: reduce or eliminate bonus payments; reduce non-
pay benefits; change shift assignments or shift premia; slow or freeze rate at which 
promotions are filled; recruit new employees at lower wage level than those who left 
voluntarily; and encourage early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with 
lower wages.  
 
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we document comparable information on 
labour cost adjustment practices beyond base wages for a large set of EU countries and 
sectors. This allows us to discuss the relative importance of each individual strategy across 
countries characterised by different sets of laws and institutions governing their labour 
markets. Our survey shows that firms fairly commonly use strategies to reduce labour costs 
other than reducing base wages – 63% of the firms’ managers said they had used at least one 
other margin of adjustment in the recent past, and 58% had used at least one of the six 
margins explicitly identified in the survey. We find substantial heterogeneity in the use of 
these strategies across countries and firms, depending on firm characteristics and labour 
market institutions. 3 
 
 
Second, we examine characteristics of firms and the environments in which they operate that 
determine the relative importance of each type of labour cost adjustment mechanism. The use 
of each margin is related to several firm characteristics such as the relative size or skills 
distribution as well as several indicators of the economic environment in which they operate. 
In particular, larger firms show greater margin of manoeuvre with respect to using any of 
these strategies in order to adjust labour costs. Different indicators of the severity of 
competition suggest that firms in more competitive environments are more likely to use some 
of these strategies more heavily. Furthermore, we find that the presence of unions in wage 
setting is associated with a greater use of most of the strategies. A plausible explanation is 
that unions limit the flexibility of wages, pushing firms towards alternative labour cost cutting 
strategies.  
 
Finally, we show how the use of these adjustment practices can be related to firms’ 
experience regarding nominal wage rigidity, as well as to the extent of wage indexation 
operating in the firms. When we control for different indicators of wage rigidity (either 
nominal wage rigidity or alternative definitions of wage indexation) the impact of 
unionisation on the use of alternative margins remains. Moreover, we find that firms subject 
to nominal wage rigidities are much more likely to use each of the six cost-cutting strategies. 
This indicates that there is some degree of substitutability between wage flexibility and the 
flexibility of other labour cost components, and that this substitutability is not limited by the 
presence of unions in wage setting.  4 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Wages of incumbent workers are seldom cut, even in the face of large negative shocks. 
During the last few years, a growing body of literature using micro data has documented the 
importance of downward wage rigidities in several countries and over a range of time periods. 
In the US, clear signs of resistance to nominal wage cuts are found in all studies (see among 
others Kahn, 1997; Altonji and Devereux, 2000, and Lebow et al. 2003). More recently, a 
comprehensive cross-country study conducted in the framework of the International Wage 
Flexibility Project (IWFP) has demonstrated the existence of downward rigidity in real wages 
in addition to nominal wages in many European countries (Dickens et al. 2007, 2008).  
 
Understanding the relative flexibility of labour costs is essential for a better understanding of 
the working of the economy at the macro level. From a monetary policy perspective, the 
adjustment of marginal costs to economic shocks determines the slope of the Philips curve in 
New Keynesian Models (Galí and Gertler, 1999). From a labour perspective, understanding 
the links between wage rigidities and unemployment was emphasised by Layard et al. (1991), 
and most of the empirical micro literature on wage rigidities retained this subject as the main 
motivation for the analysis.
1 However, even if base wages are rigid, does such wage rigidity 
necessarily imply rigid labour cost structures? Firms have other margins of adjustment 
beyond base wages to manage their wage bills, including the adjustment of flexible pay 
components such as bonuses or fringe benefits, the adjustment of labour costs via re-
organization of production, or using labour turnover as a tool to adjust labour costs to changes 
in economic activity. These other margins have hardly been studied in the existing literature. 
 
This paper broadens the discussion of the relative rigidity of wages to include the flexibility 
of other adjustment mechanisms that involve the use of labour inputs. Using a unique survey 
from a large sample of European firms, we are able to identify the incidence of the following 
labour cost-saving strategies: reduce or eliminate bonus payments; reduce non-pay benefits; 
change shift assignments or shift premia; slow or freeze rate at which promotions are filled; 
recruit new employees at lower wage level than those who left voluntarily; and encourage 
early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with lower wages. The paper 
makes three contributions to the literature. First, we document comparable information on 
labour cost adjustment practices beyond base wages for a large set of EU countries and 
sectors. This allows us to discuss the relative importance of each individual strategy across 
countries characterised by different sets of laws and institutions governing their labour 
                                                 
1 See Goette et al. (2007) and the references therein.   5 
 
markets. Second, we examine the characteristics of firms and the environments in which they 
operate that determine the relative importance of each type of labour cost adjustment 
mechanism.  Finally, we show how the use of these adjustment practices can be related to 
firms’ experience regarding nominal wage rigidity, as well as to the extent of wage indexation 
operating in the firm. 
 
In order to address these questions, we use a novel firm-level survey that contains detailed 
qualitative information for a large number of firms in 12 EU countries. The survey was 
carried out within the framework of the Wage Dynamics Network, a research network 
sponsored by a consortium of Central Banks of the EU and coordinated by the European 
Central Bank.  The most important advantage of using qualitative information from a firm 
survey refers to the possibility of addressing a broad set of adjustment practices, most of 
which are typically not observable even in the richest matched employer-employee datasets 
and are therefore new to the literature.   
 
Our survey shows that firms fairly commonly use strategies to reduce labour costs other than 
reducing base wages – 63% of the firms’ managers said they had used at least one other 
margin of adjustment in the recent past, and 58% had used at least one of the six margins 
explicitly identified in the survey. The use of each margin is related to several firm 
characteristics such as the relative size or skills distribution, as well as several indicators of 
the economic environment in which they operate. Firms in more competitive environments 
tend to use some of these strategies more heavily. Similarly, the degree and characteristics of 
union involvement in the wage setting process shape the need and ability of firms to use 
different margins. 
 
The paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 describes the main characteristics of the survey 
and the sample used in the paper.  Section 3 describes various compensation channels - other 
than base wages - that firms may use to reduce labour costs and the frequency with which 
they are used in different countries and sectors. Section 4 relates the choice of cost reduction 
methods to firm characteristics and attributes of the economic environment in which they 
operate.  Section 5 looks at the relationship between these alternative margins of cost-cutting 
strategies and the recent firm experience of nominal wage rigidity and indexation 






2.  Survey Design and Sample Characteristics  
 
The firm survey was conducted between the second half of 2007 and the first quarter of 2008 
in 16 European Union countries, 12 of which included the questions on alternative margins of 
labour cost adjustment analysed here:  Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia.
2 The survey was carried out 
by the National Central Banks and all countries used a harmonised questionnaire as the basis 
for the survey.  This questionnaire was developed in the context of the Eurosystem Wage 
Dynamics Network, a research network analysing wage and labour cost dynamics. The 
collection of information varied across countries, the survey being conducted in most cases by 
traditional mail, but phone and face-to-face interviews were also used. The survey was 
directed at the company’s CEO, or to senior-level human resources management employee(s).  
 
The harmonised questionnaire contained a core set of questions, referring to general firm 
characteristics, and the firms’ price and wage setting strategies that were included in all 
counties’ questionnaires.
3 An enlarged questionnaire, including the relevant questions for this 
study, was used in 12 countries. This harmonised questionnaire was further adapted by some 
countries to account for specific country characteristics and different institutional 
frameworks, but it retained its comparability in all the dimensions covered in this paper.  
 
The sample frame in each country was based on firms with at least 5 employees.   The sectors 
covered are manufacturing, energy, construction, market services, non-market services, trade 
and financial intermediation; there are however differences in the sectoral coverage of 
individual countries. The sample used here covers around 12,000 firms representing around 
37.2 million employees.
4 A description of the distribution of the sample by country, sector 
and size is provided in Appendix 2.    
 
In order to make the results representative of the total population the sample statistics 
presented in the following sections use employment adjusted weights. For each 
firm/observation these weights indicate the number of employees each observation represents 
in the population. They can be roughly calculated as the population employment divided by 
                                                 
2 Luxembourg is also conducting the survey and the data will be made available to the network’s 
researchers at a later stage. 
3 Firms were instructed to answer the wage setting questions with reference to their main occupational 
group.  
4 Appendix 1 provides detailed information on the survey characteristics. 7 
 
the number of firms (in each stratum), in the realised sample.
 5 For a detailed description on 




3.  Non-wage cost-cutting strategies 
 
Apart from a decrease in base wages, firms could use other ways of reducing labour costs 
when faced by negative exogenous shocks, for example by cutting bonuses and benefits, 
encouraging earlier retirement and hiring workers at lower wages than those who have 
recently quit. The adjustment of non-wage labour costs has gained attention in the policy 
debate due to two main reasons. First, non-wage labour costs represent a substantial (and 
rising) part in total compensation (see, e.g. Oyer, 2005; Chen and Funke, 2003). Since firms 
are primarily concerned with total compensation per employee, an assessment of the 
flexibility of non-wage labour costs is as important as evaluation of the degree of base wage 
flexibility (Lebow and Saks, 2003). Second, in an environment of sticky prices and wages, 
non-wage labour costs become an important adjustment tool to exogenous shocks, allowing 
dampening of the effects of negative demand shocks on the firm's employment (Chen and 
Funke, 2005). 
 
Non-wage labour costs can be divided into two broad categories - statutory and non-statutory. 
Statutory non-wage labour costs, for example employer’s social security contributions, are 
imposed by law and a firm cannot change them with respect to a particular worker. Non-
statutory non-wage labour costs are either determined by collective agreements or can be set 
at the discretion of the employer. Private pension schemes, bonuses and benefits belong to 
this non-statutory category. Hence, firms have a certain freedom in using non-statutory non-
wage labour costs (or at least a part of them) to adjust to shocks. It is these non-statutory 
labour costs “addressable” at the firm-level that we intend to study from the survey data. 
Additionally, firms might use labour turnover or internal reorganisation as a tool to achieve 
labour cost flexibility. They might replace voluntary or involuntary resignations or 
retirements of high tenure (and hence high wage) workers for younger workers that are 
willing to work at a lower wage. Similarly, they might limit the extent of promotions or use 
working shifts as a cost cutting strategy during an economic downturn. 
 
                                                 
5 Strata refer to the sampling categories in which the population of firms are divided in order to do the 
sampling. For most of the cases they are defined by sector and size, i.e. one sampling category can be 
firms with 5-19 employees in manufacturing. 
6 The employment adjusted weights account for the unequal probabilities across strata of receiving, and 
responding to the questionnaire as well as for the number of employees by firm in the population in 
each stratum (average firm size).  8 
 
In our survey, we asked managers directly about their firm’s use of these other policies in the 
recent past. In this paper we use factual questions about what types of margins firms have 
used. Concretely, we identified the following main strategies to cut labour costs (other than 
wages) reported by the majority of national surveys (see question 18 Appendix 4) by asking: 
Has any of the following strategies ever been used in your firm to reduce labour costs? Firms 
were allowed to choose as many options as they wished from the following list:  
  Reduce or eliminate bonus payments; 
  Reduce or eliminate non-pay benefits; 
  Change shift assignments or shift premia; 
  Slow or freeze the rate at which promotions are filled; 
  Recruit new employees at a lower wage level than those who left voluntarily; 
  Encourage early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with lower 
wages; 
  Use other strategies.  
 
Obviously, these various margins are likely to be used to respond to different shocks. As an 
example, changing the workforce composition could be used following a permanent shock to 
the firm, while changing shift assignments or shift premia might be a more common reaction 
to a temporary shock. This is beyond the scope of the factual survey questions on which this 
paper is based. However, these factual questions have the great advantage of being more 
likely to solicit precise information. Using hypothetical questions from the same survey, 
Bertola et al. (2009) look into the reaction of firms to different types of shocks, distinguishing 
the adjustment of wages, prices, margins, output and employment. 
 
Summary statistics of the percentage of firms (weighted by employment) that reported use of 
at least one of the first six strategies listed above are presented in Table 1. It clearly indicates 
that firms make extensive use of different cost cutting strategies in Europe, albeit there is 
substantial variability across countries. While in Lithuania all workers have seen how at least 
one of the strategies has affected their labour relations, in Portugal the percentage of affected 
workers falls to 40%. On average, 63% of the workers in our sample have been affected, and 
differences in the incidence of these adjustment mechanisms between Euro-area and non-Euro 
area countries do not seem to be particularly relevant.  
 
Perhaps the first and most striking feature of Table 1 is that the prevalence of individual 
strategies varies quite substantially across countries. The reduction of bonus payments is the 
most common method used by firms outside the Euro-area: in the Czech Republic (32%), 
Estonia (40%), Lithuania (41%) and Poland (24%). The western European countries appear 9 
 
less likely to use bonuses in order to reduce costs with the exception of Italy, where almost a 
quarter of firms report using this method. Labour turnover instead seems to be an important 
element of adjustment in Western Europe.
7 Hiring new employees at lower rates than those 
who left the company is the most important adjustment mechanism in Belgium (26%), France 
(39%), Italy (46%) and to some extent Portugal, where it affects 16% of the employees. 
Similarly, while using early retirement as an adjustment tool is never the main method of 
adjustment, it is fairly commonly used in these countries. In Belgium (19%), France (30%) 
and Italy (20%), the average use of early retirement is above the total mean (16.5%).  
 
A third group of countries shows substantial flexibility regarding internal work organisation. 
This is the case for instance in Hungary, where more than 73% of the workers in our sample 
have been affected by at least one of the following strategies: shift changes and the slowing 
down of promotions, as an attempt set forth by their employers to cut labour costs. This is 
also the case in Italy, where 50% of employees have been affected by at least one of these 
practices. The strategy least used by firms is the reduction of benefits. This demonstrates that 
benefits are a less flexible labour cost component than bonuses (affecting 15% of workers in 
total against 23% in the case of bonuses).   
 
In addition to the variation across countries, we find that the choice of strategies also tends to 
differ across sectors (Table 2). The use of cheaper hires to replace workers who leave the firm 
is the dominant strategy in most sectors. Firms in manufacturing report a relatively even 
spread across the different strategies. Energy and financial intermediation sectors are the most 
likely to target bonuses and benefits when trying to reduce costs. Early retirement is the least 
likely strategy to be followed: this is similar to the pattern in Table 1, where France was the 
only country with a significant proportion of firms to use this strategy.  The non-market 
services sector presented the lowest usage of the non-wage cost-cutting strategies. 
                                                 
7 Bonuses and benefits account, on average, for 11% of total wage bill (10% in the Euro-area countries 
and 16% in the non-Euro area counties). Table A5 in Appendix 2 gives detailed results by country.  10 
 
 

















Use at least 
one strategy 
Belgium  1,431  0.184 0.079 0.072 0.150 0.264 0.189  0.460 
Czech Republic  399  0.322 0.075 0.111 0.019 0.087 0.089  0.679 
Estonia  366  0.402 0.205 0.211 0.062 0.162 0.026  0.936 
France  2,029  0.147 0.061  n.a  0.154 0.390 0.303  0.586 
Greece 
(a)  402  0.204 0.124  n.a  n.a  n.a  n.a  0.835 
Hungary  2,006  0.227 0.119 0.383 0.351 0.265 0.102  0.672 
Ireland  985  0.169 0.078 0.160 0.094 0.370 0.098  0.909 
Italy  953  0.256 0.218 0.260 0.340 0.456 0.202  0.712 
Lithuania  337  0.410 0.250 0.199 0.106 0.179 0.027  1.000 
Poland  908  0.236 0.163 0.124 0.128 0.237 0.109  0.505 
Portugal  1,436  0.137 0.084 0.107 0.140 0.162 0.000 0.395
Slovenia  666  0.135 0.128 0.091 0.189 0.158 0.089  0.575 
Total  11,918  0.226 0.147 0.191 0.206 0.323 0.165  0.631 
Euro area  7,902  0.205 0.146 0.212 0.246 0.387 0.203  0.645 
Non-euro area  4,016  0.267 0.149 0.163 0.134 0.207 0.097  0.604 
Notes: proportion of firms that use given strategy, weighted by employment. 
(a) In Greece the question was formulated in a different way. Therefore, the last 
column refers to the proportion of firms that have reduced bonuses, non-pay benefits, overtime hours, number of employees and have engaged in restructuring (the 























Use at least 
one strategy 
Manufacturing  5,057  0.209 0.135 0.189 0.204 0.319 0.177 0.615
Energy  107  0.301 0.216 0.040 0.127 0.182  0.253  0.667 
Construction  932  0.210 0.149 0.113 0.130 0.166  0.058  0.521 
Trade  2,277  0.250 0.173 0.220 0.216 0.374  0.109  0.648 
Market services  3,064  0.233 0.147 0.212 0.219 0.330  0.189  0.662 
Financial intermediation  225  0.300 0.149 0.050 0.229 0.365  0.294  0.620 
Non-market services  192  0.096 0.045 0.118 0.118 0.183  0.041  0.426 
Notes: proportion of firms that use given strategy, weighted by employment 12 
 
The cost reduction strategies are obviously not mutually exclusive and we find that firms will 
relatively frequently use more than one of the methods. Half of the firms in the sample 
reported having used non-wage cost reductions at some point. Of these firms, slightly less 
than half (49%) used one margin of adjustment only; 30% used a combination of two methods 
and 14% used a combination of three. The remaining 8% used more than three of the six 
methods identified.
8  This leads us to ask if certain combinations of the strategies are more 
likely to be used than others.  
 
Table 3 reports correlation coefficients for the pairings of different strategies.  As might be 
expected due to their complementary nature, reductions in benefits and bonuses have one of 
the highest correlations (0.28). Cheaper hires to replace workers who left voluntarily and 
encouragement of early retirement to create vacancies for lower-paid, more junior staff is 
another pairing with a high correlation (0.23), suggesting that some firms are using turnover 
to reduce labour costs. Finally, a third strategic combination regards the use of the company’s 
internal wage structure, with changes in shift patterns and slowing of promotions making up 
the third pair of strategies with the highest correlation.    
 
Table 3: Correlations between non- wage labour cost reduction strategies  
 
Note: All correlations are significant at the 1% level. Number of observations: 9,170.   
 
4.  The choice among non-wage cost-cutting strategies 
 
Why are firms using some of these strategies and others not? Our survey can provide some 
guidance regarding the determinants of engaging in each of the cost-cutting strategies 
identified above. We start by analysing in more detail the determinants of using any of the six 
labour cost adjustment strategies proposed by the survey. We consider a set of firm 
characteristics such as the structure of its labour force: share of high and low skilled blue and 
                                                 
8 It may be important to note that the question asked if these methods had “ever been used”.  Therefore firms 














Reduce bonuses  1          
Reduce benefits  0.279 1         
Change shifts  0.107 0.133  1       
Slow promotions  0.141 0.190 0.318  1     
Cheaper hires  0.132 0.143 0.133  0.213  1   
Early retirement  0.130 0.143 0.138  0.205  0.234  1 13 
 
white collars, the share of workers holding a temporary versus an open ended contract, 
indicators of firm size, and the share of labour costs in total costs.   
 
We also consider two different indicators of product market competition. Our first indicator is 
labelled as “perceived competition”, and ranks the degree of competition according to the 
manager’s answers to a direct question: “to what extent does your firm experience 
competition for its main product” in four categories: severe, strong, weak, no competition. 
The second indicator is labelled as “implied competition”, and corresponds to the managers 
answers to the following question: “suppose that the main competitor for your firm’s main 
product decreases its prices; how likely is your firm to react by decreasing its own price?” 
Depending on whether price responses are very likely, likely, not likely or not at all, we rank 
again the degree of perceived competition in four categories: severe, strong, weak and no 
competition, where the former is linked to the answers “very likely” and the latter to the 
managers who respond “not at all”. Similarly, we consider two different sets of indicators of 
union activity. First, we asked managers regarding the percentage of workers that were 
covered by collective agreements. We label this variable “coverage”. Second, we asked 
managers about the predominant wage setting that applies to their firms, which allow us to 
differentiate four categories: individual negotiations, firm level agreements with unions, 
sectoral/national wage bargaining agreements and both (firm level and sectoral/national 
agreements). Summary statistics of all the variables used in the analysis are presented in 
Table A6 in Appendix 2. 
  
Table 4 highlights the relationship between firm characteristics and the tendency to use any 
labour cost-cutting strategy. The analysis is based on the results of probit regressions, where 
the dependent variable is 1 if the firm has used at least one of the labour cost adjustment 
strategies and 0 otherwise. Importantly, all the specifications include country fixed effects, 
which eliminate possible biases due to idiosyncrasies in the country questionnaires (e.g. due 
to language differences in the formulation of the questions or data collection methods). 
Similarly, all specifications include sectoral dummies. 
 
Perhaps not surprisingly, we find that larger firms make more extensive use of all margins of 
labour cost cutting strategies. According to the estimates presented in Column 1 of Table 4, in 
large firms (above 200 employees) the probability of using non-wage strategies increases by 
23 percentage points with respect to the baseline category (firms below 20 employees). The 
positive relation between firm size and the use of cost cutting strategies is monotonically 
increasing and highly significant across all specifications. We also find that firms which have 
a higher share of labour costs in total costs have a tendency to use labour cost cutting 14 
 
strategies more heavily, which is reassuring. Perhaps less straightforward is that, within 
sectors and countries, firms with a higher share of white collars use these cost-cutting margins 
more extensively. This is especially significant if we differentiate between low skilled blue 
and white collars. In all but one of our specifications we find a significantly negative 
statistical relationship indicating that a higher share of low skilled blue collars reduces the 
probability of engaging in any of the identified labour cost-cutting strategies.   
 
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 4 present our alternative indicators of product market competition. 
Their message is broadly consistent, indicating a positive association between the use of 
labour cost-cutting strategies and the intensity of competition. If we consider the indicator of 
perceived competition, the relationship is clearly monotonically increasing, with weak 
competition increasing the use of the margins by 9 percentage points (pp) with respect to no 
competition, strong competition by 12pp and severe competition by 15pp. The relationship is 
non-monotonic but positive and significant with the indicator of “implied competition”. In 
this case we find that firms operating in strong or severe competition environments are 
unambiguously related to a more intense use of cost-cutting margins that firms facing no, or 
weak, competition. The impact of competition is reinforced by the positive and statistically 
significant association between the share of exports and the use of cost-cutting margins, since 
firms operating in international markets are expected to face even higher competitive 
pressures. 
 
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 4 consider the role of wage setting and its influence on the use of 
labour cost-cutting margins. In column 3, we find that firms characterised by a higher union 
coverage are more likely to use such margins of labour cost adjustment. This might indicate 
that unions exert pressure on firms that results in rigid base wage structures. As a result, firms 
try to overcome such restrictions by acting on other margins. We will explore this hypothesis 
further in the next section. Note that our variable for union coverage is available for a 
restricted set of firms. Hence, its inclusion results in losing almost 15% of the sample. 
However, the impact of unionization is confirmed in column 4, where we replace the indicator 
of union coverage by three dummies that characterise the type of union contracts applying to 
the firm: firm level, sectoral/national level, both. Table A4 in Appendix 2 shows the 
distribution by country of this variable. We find that any sort of union involvement in wage 
negotiations results in a higher likelihood of using non-wage adjustment mechanisms with 
respect to firms that are mainly characterised by individual negotiations. Perhaps surprisingly, 
we do not find significant differences between the three levels of wage negotiations outlined 
above.     




Table 4: Non-wage margins of labour cost adjustment: probit regressions 
 
Dependent variable equals one if at least one margin is used 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) 
        
Low skilled blue collar (%)  -0.046*  -0.052*  -0.060**  -0.042 
   (0.099)  (0.055) (0.044) (0.136) 
High skilled blue collar (%)  -0.021  -0.010  -0.031  -0.019 
   (0.500)  (0.745) (0.343) (0.541) 
Low skilled white collar (%)  0.024  0.042  0.019  0.025 
   (0.532)  (0.274) (0.646) (0.531) 
Exporting firm  0.027**  0.032**  0.027*  0.028** 
   (0.046)  (0.015) (0.068) (0.039) 
Share of labour costs  0.060* 0.097*** 0.068** 0.075** 
   (0.056)  (0.002) (0.044) (0.017) 
Temporary workers (%) 0.005 -0.013 0.024 0.009 
   (0.874)  (0.708) (0.508) (0.794) 
Size=20-49  0.109*** 0.113*** 0.079*** 0.106*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=50-199  0.171*** 0.182*** 0.132*** 0.162*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=200+  0.228*** 0.238*** 0.168*** 0.210*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Implied competition - weak    0.019     
     (0.454)    
Implied competition – strong    0.090***     
     (0.000)    
Implied  competition - severe 0.076***  
     (0.004)    
Perceived competition - weak  0.088**    0.112***  0.098** 
   (0.032)    (0.009) (0.017) 
Perceived competition – strong  0.124***    0.149***  0.135*** 
   (0.001)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Perceived competition - severe  0.150***    0.171***  0.159*** 
   (0.000)    (0.000) (0.000) 
Coverage     0.051***  
       (0.001)  
Only outside agreement        0.057*** 
         (0.007) 
Only firm agreement  0.072*** 
         (0.003) 
Firm and outside agreement 0.065** 
         (0.013) 
Observations  7738 7979 6623 7634 
Notes: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported. 




We move next to the analysis of the determinants of the six labour cost adjustment strategies 
proposed by the survey considered separately. Table 5 presents the estimates of probit 
regressions for the likelihood of using each strategy, including our preferred set of regressors: 
firm characteristics, the indicator of perceived competition, and three separate dummies 
characterising the bargaining environment dominating wage negotiations. Some of the effects 
identified in Table 4 go in essentially the same way for all of the margins. Firm size is a clear 
example, being positively related to the probability of using each individual margin.   
 
Worker characteristics, on the other hand, have different effects on the likelihood of choosing 
each of these margins.  Firms with higher percentages of blue-collar workers are less likely to 
use bonus and benefit reduction than those with a high proportion of high-skilled white-collar 
workers, probably reflecting greater use of flexible pay components among the latter group.  
The choice of slowing promotions is also negatively related to the percentage of low-skilled 
blue-collar workers, suggesting that white collar workers are more frequently involved in 
tournaments for promotions. Such competitions can be slowed down by firms during 
downturns or periods of restructuring. On the other hand, firms using a higher proportion of 
blue-collar workers are significantly more likely to use changes in shifts if they want to 
reduce costs. This is easy to rationalise if we think that shift work is more common among 
blue than white collar workers. Firms using temporary workers are associated with a greater 
probability of the firm choosing to reduce benefits as a cost cutting strategy. Perhaps 
surprisingly, we do not find significant differences in the use of bonuses among temporary 
and permanent workers. Not surprisingly instead, early retirement is a tool more commonly 
used among firms with a greater proportion of workers with open-ended contracts.  
 
As regards product market competition, we find that the effects outlined above are mainly 
driven by three margins: the reduction in benefits, the replacement of voluntary leavers with 
the recruitment of new employees at lower wages and changes in shift assignments. Some 
competition is associated with a significant increase in the first two strategies, while changing 
shifts is only pushed as an alternative adjustment mechanism by severe competition. Finally, 
we looked at the differentiated impact of wage bargaining regimes on the alternative margins 
under consideration. As before, the presence of unions in the wage setting process is 
associated with a more intensive use of all margins with the exception of bonus reductions. 
This suggests that unions might limit not only the flexibility of base wages, as suggested by 
previous literature, but also the use of flexible wage components. With the exception of 
changes in shifts, we tend to find that the presence of agreements at the firm level is in 
general associated with a more intensive use of each margin of adjustment. Using early 
retirement to replace high wage workers with new entrants at lower wages is a good example 17 
 
of this pattern. Outside agreements are associated with a 4.2 pp increase in the use of this tool, 
while in firms with predominantly firm-level agreements the use of this adjustment 
mechanism increases by 7.4 pp with respect to firms who bargain with workers individually. 
Having instead a firm and a sectoral/national level agreement applying jointly reinforces this 
effect, up to 9.8 pp with respect to individual negotiations. The only exception regards 
changes in shift assignments. In this case, outside agreements increase their use by 5pp, and 
this is reinforced by the joint occurrence of firm and higher level agreements. However, firms 
that apply firm level agreements only do not use this strategy differently than firms 
characterised by individual negotiations. 
Table 5: Non-wage margins of labour cost adjustment: probit regressions 
 














Low skilled blue collar (%)  -0.040*  -0.035**  0.069***  -0.066***  -0.021  0.034 
   (0.051)  (0.017)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.378)  (0.113) 
High skilled blue collar (%)  -0.034  -0.060***  0.051**  -0.016  0.011  0.029 
   (0.151)  (0.000)  (0.046)  (0.445)  (0.671)  (0.249) 
Low skilled white collar (%)  0.036  -0.027  0.024  0.028  -0.035  0.091*** 
   (0.217)  (0.206)  (0.462)  (0.307)  (0.311)  (0.002) 
Exporting firm  0.021**  0.010  -0.007  -0.003  0.017  -0.008 
   (0.044)  (0.175)  (0.518)  (0.756)  (0.132)  (0.398) 
Share of labour costs  0.048**  0.009  -0.023  0.045**  0.055**  0.004 
   (0.044)  (0.624)  (0.364)  (0.032)  (0.035)  (0.864) 
Only outside agreement  0.028  0.025*  0.052***  -0.021  0.015  0.042** 
   (0.110)  (0.052)  (0.007)  (0.177)  (0.417)  (0.033) 
Only firm agreement  0.011  0.033**  0.015  0.016  0.038*  0.074*** 
   (0.536)  (0.013)  (0.412)  (0.328)  (0.068)  (0.000) 
Firm and outside agreement  0.025  0.041**  0.085***  -0.011  0.011  0.098*** 
   (0.233)  (0.018)  (0.003)  (0.588)  (0.614)  (0.000) 
Temporary workers (%)  0.007  0.032*  0.062**  0.024  0.031  -0.066** 
   (0.784)  (0.070)  (0.021)  (0.300)  (0.286)  (0.015) 
Size=20-49 0.046***  0.023**  0.049***  0.047***  0.097***  0.058*** 
   (0.002)  (0.040)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size=50-199 0.068***  0.035***  0.080***  0.071***  0.109***  0.068*** 
   (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Size=200+ 0.097***  0.050***  0.070***  0.090***  0.156***  0.148*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Perceived comp – weak  0.033  0.052*  0.032  0.005  0.118***  -0.012 
   (0.330)  (0.064)  (0.356)  (0.870)  (0.006)  (0.666) 
Perceived comp – strong  0.045  0.045**  0.030  0.029  0.115***  -0.034 
   (0.127)  (0.045)  (0.313)  (0.268)  (0.002)  (0.181) 
Perceived comp – severe  0.038  0.053**  0.065**  0.035  0.138***  -0.001 
   (0.206)  (0.023)  (0.036)  (0.180)  (0.000)  (0.982) 
Observations 7634  7634  5689  7306  7306  6148 
Notes: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are 
reported. Regressions include country and sector fixed effects. 18 
 
5.  Wage Rigidity and Non-Wage Labour Cost Adjustment 
 
Are firms subject to wage rigidity more likely to use the alternative margins of adjusting 
labour costs?    In the previous section we have found that firms are more likely to use other 
channels of labour costs adjustment besides reducing base wages if unions are present in wage 
setting. In parallel, there is an ample literature now (Dickens et al., 2007, Holden and 
Wulfsberg, 2008 and Babecký et al., 2009, the latter using this dataset) suggesting a 
prominent role of unions in the determination of downward (nominal or real) wage rigidity. 
Hence, it is natural to ask in our framework if firms subject to some form of wage rigidity are 
more likely to use any of these other margins of adjustment.   
 
Our survey allows the construction of three different measures of wage rigidity. We asked 
directly the managers of firms if they ever cut or froze wages during the previous five years. 
Following the identifying assumption in some of the micro literature of downward nominal 
wage rigidity (see for instance Nickell and Quintini, 2003), we regard firms that froze wages 
at any point during this interval as showing evidence of nominal wage rigidity. Most likely 
this reflects downward nominal wage rigidity, since an analysis of more than 360 yearly wage 
change distributions for individuals who stayed in the same job in a large number of countries 
suggests upward nominal wage rigidity, as suggested by 'menu costs', is not an important 
element of wage setting (Dickens et al., 2007). However, our data does not allow 
disentangling symmetric from asymmetric nominal wage rigidity, so we cannot rule out that 
some of these wage freezes reflect pure menu costs. Nonetheless, they constitute a symptom 
of rigid wage structures. An important element to take into account is that this measure refers 
to the previous five years. Since the survey was conducted between the end of 2007 and the 
beginning of 2008, in most cases the firms are responding about the incidence of wage freezes 
in an upswing, or period of relatively favourable conditions. Hence, we are most likely under-
estimating the incidence of downward nominal wage rigidity. In this case, to the extent that 
the latent association between downward nominal wage rigidity and the use of alternative 
margins of labour cost adjustment is positive, our estimates would be a lower bound of the 
true impact.   
  
We also asked firms if they had a policy that linked wage changes to inflation. Firms that 
replied yes to this question were further asked if the link with inflation was automatic or 
discretionary and whether the link was with respect to past or expected inflation. Using 
information from these questions, we consider two different definitions of wage indexation, 
which we view as a particular form of real wage rigidity. We consider firms to apply a “strict 
indexation rule” if they have an automatic link between wages and past or expected inflation, 19 
 
i.e. those who apply automatic wage indexation. This form of indexation is usually considered 
as an institutional feature of a country's or sector's wage formation settings. Alternatively, we 
consider firms to apply a “formal or informal indexation rule” if they link or take into account 
inflation at the time of setting wages. The second definition is broader, applies to more firms 
and shows more variation between firms. It is therefore less well captured by country-level 
institutional information (see Du Caju et al., 2008). 
 
Table 6 shows that indexation is much more prevalent in our data (17% of firms are affected 
by strict indexation rules, while 35% apply some form of formal or informal indexation) than 
wage freezes (only 9% of firms are affected), which is consistent with other evidence on wage 
rigidity in most continental European countries, as opposed to the US and the UK (see e.g. 
Dickens et al., 2008). Wage freezes appear more common than average in the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and the Netherlands. They are considerably rarer than average in 
Spain, France, Hungary, Italy and Slovenia. Automatic indexation mechanisms are especially 
prevalent in Belgium, Spain and Slovenia, and much less so in Italy, Estonia and Poland. 
Overall, we find that the non-euro member states of the EU are almost twice as likely to 
experience wage freezes compared to the euro area member states, but that the reverse is true 
for pure indexation mechanisms. 













Austria 0.133  0.098  0.221 
Belgium 0.118  0.982  0.982 
Czech Republic  0.265  0.117  0.590 
Estonia 0.217  0.044  0.538 
Spain 0.024  0.548  0.707 
France 0.071  0.096  0.322 
Greece 0.125  0.200  0.426 
Hungary 0.059  0.112  0.315 
Ireland 0.087  0.095  0.318 
Italy 0.039  0.017  0.058 
Lithuania 0.199  0.108  0.486 
Netherlands 0.232  n.a.  n.a. 
Poland 0.100  0.069  0.307 
Portugal 0.150  0.090  0.509 
Slovenia 0.029  0.235  0.605 
Total  0.096 0.167  0.352 
Euro area  0.082 0.201  0.376 
Non-euro area  0.134 0.085  0.343 
Note: Proportion of firms having frozen wages over the past five years and applying an automatic or 
non-automatic indexation mechanism, employment-weighted averages 20 
 
 
Our next set of regressions examines the relationship between wage rigidities and the 
different margins of adjustment analysed above. First, we run probit regressions of the 
likelihood of using any margin, and each of the margins separately, and add measures of wage 
freezes and automatic indexation mechanisms among the set of covariates. A second set of 
regressions replaces the measure of formal indexation with our broader measure of 
indexation, including formal and informal arrangement. In all specifications we retain the 
basic set of control variables including country and sector fixed effects, the three indicators of 
labour force characteristics, firm size dummies, the share of temporary contracts and labour 
costs in total costs, indicators of perceived competition, and a set of dummies characterising 
the bargaining arrangement most prevalent in the firm.  
 
The first part of Table 7 presents the results for wage freezes and strict indexation rules, and 
indicates a clear positive association between nominal wage rigidity on the likelihood of using 
some of the margins of labour cost adjustment previously identified. Having experienced a 
wage freeze during the preceding five years increases the likelihood of using other margins of 
labour cost cutting by 23 pp.  The effect is significant at the 1% level. This effect is relatively 
large, especially taking into account that it represents a lower bound of the true relationship 
between the two variables. Quite surprisingly, we find that firms applying a strict indexation 
rule are less likely to use some of the non-wage cost-cutting strategies. The marginal effect is 
much smaller in this case (-4 pp) than in the case of wage freezes, and only significant at the 
10% level. One possible explanation for this finding is that the same factors that drive formal 
wage indexation mechanisms at the firm level limit the use of other labour cost-cutting 
strategies. It should be noted however than when we replace the strict indexation rules for our 
indicator of “formal and informal” indexation (second part of Table 7) the marginal effect is 
of smaller magnitude, and not statistically different from zero. 
 
When we move to the analysis of each margin considered separately, we find that a positive 
significant relationship with nominal wage rigidity applies across the board. The marginal 
effects in Table 7 range from 15 pp in the case of slowing down the promotions to 4 pp in the 
case of using early retirement to replace high wage workers with new entrants at lower wages. 
In all cases the marginal effects are statistically significant at the 1% level, and are virtually 
unchanged if we replace the indicator of strict indexation for formal/informal indexation in 




Table 7: The relationship between the margins of labour cost adjustment, wage rigidities 
and unionisation 
 
















Specification 1: nominal wage rigidity and strict (formal) indexation 
Nominal  wage  rigidity  0.227*** 0.126*** 0.062*** 0.074*** 0.153***  0.110*** 0.039*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) 
Strict  Indexation  -0.039* -0.033**  -0.019* -0.041**  -0.053*** 0.000  0.002 
   (0.057)  (0.038)  (0.086) (0.020) (0.000) (0.980) (0.882) 
Only outside agreement  0.057***  0.028  0.027**  0.049**  -0.022  0.013  0.044** 
   (0.008)  (0.110)  (0.042) (0.011) (0.142) (0.472) (0.021) 
Only  firm  agreement  0.077*** 0.012  0.036*** 0.020  0.018  0.037*  0.075*** 
   (0.002)  (0.497)  (0.008) (0.278) (0.277) (0.079) (0.000) 
Firm and outside 
agreement 0.075***  0.032  0.032*  0.093***  -0.009  0.013  0.104*** 
   (0.005)  (0.139)  (0.068) (0.002) (0.637) (0.575) (0.000) 
Observations  7302 7302 7302 5579 7006  7006 5870 
Specification 2: nominal wage rigidity and extended (formal and informal) indexation 
Nominal  wage  rigidity  0.230*** 0.131*** 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.159***  0.112*** 0.038*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
Formal/informal 
indexation  0.004  -0.001 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010  0.008  -0.002 
   (0.740)  (0.897)  (0.258) (0.518) (0.276) (0.486) (0.833) 
Only outside agreement  0.057***  0.028  0.026**  0.049**  -0.023  0.013  0.044** 
   (0.009)  (0.116)  (0.045) (0.012) (0.137) (0.477) (0.021) 
Only  firm  agreement  0.075*** 0.011  0.036*** 0.019  0.016  0.037*  0.076*** 
   (0.002)  (0.525)  (0.008) (0.302) (0.332) (0.082) (0.000) 
Firm and outside 
agreement 0.074***  0.032  0.032*  0.091***  -0.010  0.013  0.105*** 
   (0.006)  (0.150)  (0.070) (0.002) (0.597) (0.561) (0.000) 
Observations  7308 7308 7308 5581 7012 7012 5876
Notes: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are reported. 
Regressions include country and sector fixed effects, three indicators of labour force characteristics, 
three firm size dummies, the share of temporary contracts and labour costs in total costs and three 
dummies of perceived competition. 
 
All the regression specifications presented above control for the impact of unions including 
our usual set of dummy variables for the different types of predominant wage bargaining 
regimes. The marginal effects of the union activity dummies remain significant, and are not 
substantially altered by the inclusion of the indicators of nominal and real rigidity. Parallel to 
this result, we have experimented excluding the dummies for unions from the regressions and 
the marginal effect of nominal rigidity and indexation we obtain are very similar.
9 Similarly, 
there are no significant changes when we either include or exclude in alternative 
specifications the indicator of union coverage. This suggests that, contrary to our initial 
expectations, the indicators of wage rigidity are capturing constraints at the time of wage 
                                                 
9 Detailed results are presented in Tables A7 and A8 in Appendix 5. 22 
 
setting that are not sufficiently explained by our indicators of unionization. Attending to the 
marginal effects of nominal wage freezes, these constraints seem even more important than 
those imposed by the wage setting environment. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
We have examined the importance and determinants of six strategies firms might use to cut 
their labour costs, using a unique survey of European firms from 12 EU countries. These 
strategies are: reduce or eliminate bonus payments; reduce non-pay benefits; change shift 
assignments or shift premia; slow down or freeze the rate at which promotions are filled; 
recruit new employees at lower wage level than those who left voluntarily; and encourage 
early retirement to replace highly paid employees with entrants earning lower wages. 
 
We found substantial heterogeneity in the use of each of these strategies across countries and 
firms, depending on firm characteristics and labour market institutions. Not surprisingly, 
larger firms show greater margin of manoeuvre with respect to using any of these strategies in 
order to adjust labour costs. Similarly, different indicators of the severity of competition 
suggest that firms in more competitive environments are more likely to engage in several of 
these strategies. We found that the presence of unions in wage setting is associated with a 
greater use of most of the strategies. A plausible explanation is that unions limit the flexibility 
of wages, pushing firms towards alternative labour cost cutting strategies. However, when we 
controlled for different indicators of wage rigidity (either nominal wage rigidity or alternative 
definitions of wage indexation) the impact of unionisation on the use of these different 
margins subsists. Moreover, we find that firms subject to nominal wage rigidities are much 
more likely to use each of the six cost-cutting strategies. This indicates that there is some 
degree of substitutability between wage flexibility and the flexibility of other labour cost 
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Appendix 1: Survey characteristics 
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Appendix 2: Sample characteristics 
 
Table A1: Country composition of the sample  
Country  Number of observations  Percent of total 
Belgium   1,431 12.01 
Czech Republic   399 3.35 
Estonia   366 3.07 
France   2,029 17.02 
Greece   402 3.37 
Hungary   2,006 16.83 
Ireland   985 8.26 
Italy   953 8 
Lithuania   337 2.83 
Poland   908 7.62 
Portugal   1,436 12.05 
Slovenia   666 5.59 
Non euro area  4,016 33.7 
Euro area  7,902 66.3 
Total 11,918  100 
 
Table A2: Sectoral composition of the sample
Sector  Number of firms  Percent of total 
Manufacturing 5,057  42.66 
Energy 107  0.9 
Construction 932 7.86
Trade 2,277  19.21 
Market services  3,064  25.85 
Financial intermediation  225  1.9 
Non-market services  192  1.62 
Total 11,854 100
 
Table A3: Size composition of the sample 
Size  Number of firms  Percent of total 
5-19  2,895 24.29 
20-49  2,829 23.74 
50-199  3,793 31.83 
200+  2,401 20.15 




Table A4: Type of union contracts (% of firms) 
   Only outside agreement  Only firm agreement  Both agreements 
Belgium   0.641 0.015  (N)  0.337 
Czech Republic   0.024 0.363  (D)  0.151 
Estonia   0.017 0.087  (D)  0.017 
France   0.413 0.001  (D)  0.585 
Greece   0.726 0.076  (N)  0.133 
Hungary   0.000 0.190  (D)  0.000 
Ireland   0.407 0.036  (N)  0.278 
Italy   0.568 0.001  (N)  0.428 
Lithuania   0.005 0.234  (D)  0.003 
Poland   0.015 0.182  (D)  0.032 
Portugal   0.517 0.030  (N)  0.069 
Slovenia   0.743 0.257  (N)  0.000 
Euro area  0.535  0.016     .  0.402 
Non euro area  0.014  0.216     .  0.046 
Total  0.352  0.086     .  0.276 
 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. Total and euro 
country aggregates exclude Germany. Country-level institutional information from Du Caju et al. 
(2008) between brackets: firm-level agreements: D = company level is dominant in the country, N = 
company level is not dominant in the country. 
 
 
Table A5: Share of bonuses and benefits in total wage bill
   Mean  Standard Deviation 
Belgium   0.077 0.14 
Czech Republic   0.206 0.13 
Estonia   0.140 0.15 
France   0.113 0.23 
Greece   0.085 0.06 
Hungary   0.109 0.13 
Ireland   0.122 0.25 
Italy   0.069 0.14 
Lithuania   0.172 0.22 
Poland   0.155 0.16 
Portugal   0.322 0.23 
Slovenia   0.173 0.22 
Euro area  0.096 0.19 
Non euro area  0.160 0.16 
Total 0.113  0.18 
 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. Total and euro 




Table A6: Sample statistics 
Variable   Mean 
Number of 
observations 
Some margin (one of the following 6 
strategies) 0.581 11,483
Reduce bonuses  0.226  11,483 
Reduce benefits  0.147  11,483 
Change shifts  0.191  9,170 
Slow promotions  0.206  11,086 
Cheaper hires  0.323  11,086 
Early retirement  0.165  11,086 
Low-skilled blue collar  0.383  11,688 
High-skilled blue collar   0.217  11,688 
Low-skilled white collar  0.172  11,688 
High-skilled white collar  0.228  11,688 
Exporting firms  0.505  10,511 
Share of labour costs  0.336 10,537
Only outside agreement   0.352  11,665 
Only firm agreement  0.086 11,665
Firm and outside agreement  0.276  11,665 
Temporary workers (%)  0.114  11,722 
Coverage  0.616 9,256 
Perceived comp = severe   0.399  9,256 
Perceived comp = strong   0.500  9,256 
Perceived comp = weak   0.073  9,256 
Perceived comp = none   0.029  9,256 
Price comp = very likely  0.172  9,815 
Price comp = likely  0.467  9,815 
Price comp = not likely  0.284  9,815 
Price comp = not at all  0.077  9,815 
 
Note: Figures are employment-weighted and re-scaled to exclude non-responses. Proportion of firms; 
except in the case of high-skilled and low skilled blue and white collar workers where the numbers 
refer to proportion of workers. 30 
 
 
Appendix 3: Employment adjusted sampling weight 
 
Formally the employment adjusted sampling weight is the product of three individual 
weights:  
3 2 1 w w w wl   
1 w : adjusts for the unequal probability of firms being included in the intended sample i.e. 










N w  
h N  : Population of firms within each stratum 
*
h n  : Intended gross sample of firms within each stratum  
 













h n : Realised sample of firms within each stratum, i.e. the actual number of firms that receive 
and reply to the questionnaire 
 









N w w 2 1 , corrects for the unequal probability of firms being included in the 
realised sample. 
 









L w3  
h L : is population employment in each stratum 
 
By combining the expressions for 1 w ,  2 w and 3 w , we obtain the following expression for the 








L w . Therefore, the employment adjusted weight is 
equal to the population employment in each stratum divided by the number of firms, in each 
stratum, in the realised sample.31 
 
Appendix 4: Questions used for the creation of the variables 
Question 6 – Does your firm have a policy that adapts changes in base wages to inflation? 
Definition of base wage - direct remuneration excluding bonuses (regular wage and salary, commissions, piecework 
payments).  
No   □ 
Yes  □ 
   
Question 7 – If “yes” in question 6, please select the options that best reflects the policy followed: 
Wage changes are automatically linked to:   
                             - past inflation   □ 
                             - expected inflation   □ 
Although there is no formal rule, wage changes take into account:   
                             - past inflation  □ 
                             - expected inflation   □ 
   
Question 14 – Over the last five years, has the base wage of some employees in your firm ever been frozen?  
Definition of freeze in base wage - base wage in nominal terms remains unchanged from a pay negotiation to the next.   
    - No   □ 
    - Yes (indicate for what percentage of your employees)  _____% 
  
Question 18 –Has any of the following strategies ever been used in your firm to reduce labour costs?  
Please choose as many options as apply to your firm. 
Reduction or elimination of bonus payments  □ 
Reduction or elimination of non-pay benefits  □ 
Change in shift assignments   □ 
Slowdown or freeze of the rate at which promotions are filled  □ 
Recruitment of new employees (with similar skills and experience) at lower wage than 
those who left (e.g due to voluntary quits and retirement)  □ 
Use of early retirement to replace high wage employees by entrants with lower wages  □ 
Other strategies (please specify) _______________________________________  □ 
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Appendix 5:  Additional results 
 
Table A7: Non-wage margins of labour cost adjustment and wage rigidities 
















Low skilled blue collar 
(%)  -0.027 -0.027 -0.033**  0.075***  -0.058***  -0.021 0.028 
   (0.348)  (0.200)  (0.028)  (0.001) (0.002)  (0.365) (0.181) 
High skilled blue collar 
(%) -0.012  -0.031 
-
0.061*** 0.058**  -0.011  0.005  0.027 
   (0.714)  (0.200)  (0.000)  (0.023) (0.593)  (0.859) (0.270) 
Low skilled white collar 
(%)  0.045  0.050* -0.022 0.027  0.034  -0.029 0.095*** 
   (0.256)  (0.087)  (0.293)  (0.400) (0.211)  (0.405) (0.001) 
Exporting firm  0.023*  0.020*  0.008  -0.012  -0.005  0.010  -0.008 
   (0.097)  (0.058)  (0.279)  (0.302) (0.623)  (0.384) (0.364) 
Share of labour costs  0.053*  0.036  0.006  -0.028  0.032  0.049*  0.003 
   (0.099) (0.125) (0.714) (0.259) (0.126)  (0.059)  (0.877)
Nominal  wage  rigidity  0.227*** 0.126*** 0.061*** 0.074*** 0.152***  0.111*** 0.039*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.007)
Strict Indexation  -0.035*  -0.032**  -0.019  -0.039**  -0.053***  0.006  0.005 
   (0.092)  (0.042)  (0.102)  (0.025) (0.000)  (0.754) (0.726) 
Temporary workers (%)  0.015  0.012  0.024 0.056**  0.024  0.033 -0.074*** 
   (0.671)  (0.640)  (0.166)  (0.038) (0.296)  (0.263) (0.006) 
Size=20-49  0.100*** 0.044*** 0.024**  0.046*** 0.046***  0.100*** 0.062*** 
   (0.000)  (0.003)  (0.027)  (0.004) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=50-199  0.164*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 0.081*** 0.070***  0.115*** 0.089*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=200+  0.230*** 0.101*** 0.062*** 0.077*** 0.098***  0.173*** 0.189*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Perceived comp - weak  0.084**  0.026  0.050*  0.026  0.001  0.109**  -0.019 
   (0.044) (0.446) (0.069) (0.444) (0.976)  (0.011)  (0.462)
Perceived comp – strong  0.117***  0.035  0.039*  0.026  0.022  0.106***  -0.045* 
   (0.002)  (0.235)  (0.084)  (0.381) (0.379)  (0.003) (0.064) 
Perceived comp - severe  0.137***  0.022  0.045*  0.059*  0.020  0.128***  -0.010 
   (0.000)  (0.450)  (0.052)  (0.055) (0.446)  (0.001) (0.676) 
Observations  7394 7394 7394 5639 7098  7098 5945 
Notes: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are 
reported. Regressions include country and sector fixed effects 33 
 
Table A8: Non-wage margins of labour cost adjustment and wage rigidities: formal and 
informal indexation rules 
 
 
















Low skilled blue collar (%)  -0.025 -0.027 -0.033** 0.074*** -0.058***  -0.020  0.028
    (0.386) (0.204) (0.025) (0.001) (0.002)  (0.395) (0.191) 
High skilled blue collar (%)  -0.011  -0.030 
-
0.061*** 0.058**  -0.012  0.006  0.027 
    (0.733) (0.207) (0.000) (0.024) (0.573)  (0.829) (0.271) 
Low skilled white collar 
(%)  0.046  0.051* -0.022 0.028  0.035  -0.028 0.094*** 
   (0.245) (0.083) (0.292) (0.386) (0.193)  (0.416) (0.001)
Exporting firm  0.023*  0.021*  0.008  -0.012  -0.004  0.010  -0.008 
    (0.098) (0.053) (0.276) (0.314) (0.656)  (0.384) (0.362) 
Share of labour costs  0.054*  0.036  0.005  -0.030  0.033  0.050*  0.002 
    (0.091) (0.132) (0.774) (0.241) (0.117)  (0.058) (0.914) 
Nominal  wage  rigidity  0.231*** 0.130*** 0.062*** 0.078*** 0.158***  0.111*** 0.038*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.008) 
Formal/ informal 
indexation  0.005  -0.001 -0.007 -0.008 -0.011  0.010  -0.000 
    (0.673) (0.892) (0.289) (0.468) (0.208)  (0.365) (0.994) 
 Temporary workers (%)  0.015  0.013  0.024  0.057**  0.024  0.033  -0.075*** 
 (0.654) (0.614) (0.170) (0.036) (0.295)  (0.254) (0.006)
Size=20-49  0.099*** 0.044*** 0.024**  0.046*** 0.045***  0.099*** 0.062*** 
   (0.000) (0.003) (0.029) (0.004) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000)
Size=50-199  0.164*** 0.061*** 0.039*** 0.081*** 0.071***  0.114*** 0.089*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Size=200+  0.230*** 0.100*** 0.063*** 0.077*** 0.100***  0.171*** 0.189*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
Perceived comp - weak  0.082**  0.024  0.050*  0.024  -0.001  0.108**  -0.018 
   (0.049)  (0.470)  (0.073) (0.475) (0.977) (0.012)  (0.470) 
Perceived comp – strong  0.116***  0.034  0.038*  0.024  0.021  0.106***  -0.045* 
    (0.003) (0.252) (0.088) (0.422) (0.421)  (0.003) (0.065) 
Perceived comp - severe  0.136***  0.022  0.045*  0.057*  0.018  0.127***  -0.010 
    (0.000) (0.468) (0.055) (0.062) (0.476)  (0.001) (0.674) 
Observations  7400 7400 7400 5641 7104  7104 5951 
Notes: Robust p values in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Marginal effects are 





Appendix 6: Variable definitions 
 
Proportion of low skilled blue collar employees. 
Proportion of high skilled blue collar employees. 
Proportion of low skilled white collar employees. 
Perceived comp – weak etc: Self defined competition capturing firms’ perception regarding 
the intensity of product market competition. 
Implied comp – weak etc: implied competition. Inferred from the question on whether firms 
follow the price changes of their competitions.  
Exporting firm: Dummy taking the value of firms report having revenues from exporting 
activity. 
Share of labour cost: Proportion of total costs that are due to labour costs 
Proportion of temporary workers 
Nominal wage rigidity: Downward nominal wage rigidity-whether firms have frozen wages in 
the last five years.  
Strict indexation:  whether firms’ wages are automatically linked to past or expected inflation. 
Formal /informal indexation:  whether firms’ wages are automatically or informally  linked to 
past or expected inflation. 
Only outside agreement: Firms apply only an agreement concluded outside the firm. 
Only firm agreement: Firms apply only an agreement concluded within the firm. 
Firm and outside agreement: Firm apply both firm and outside agreement 
Coverage: Indicates the proportion of workers covered by collective bargaining contract(s) 
  
 
 